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Abstract: In dialogue with Kenneth R. Westphal’s position on realism and skepticism I
defend an empirical realism which in a positive (though not positivistic) perspective rejects
the transcendental components of Kant’s empirical realism. The central ideas of the empiri-
cal realism I support are the characterizations of reality and truth as regulative ideals and of
knowledge as unifying activity. I justify my conception by a conceptual and pragmatic anal-
ysis of the main relevant epistemological notions.
Key Words: Realism, Truth, Relativized A priori, Knowledge, Anti-foundationalism
First and foremost I would like heartily to thank Professor Cinzia Ferrini
who had the idea for this meeting and organized it. I am also extremely
grateful to Professor Kenneth R. Westphal both for his very generous
words about my work and the opportunity that provided me to discuss an
epistemological view that I feel is particularly close to mine and from
which I learned considerably. Finally, I thank them both for the useful
suggestions they offered for the improvement of my text.
1. I share Professor Westphal’s opinion that we still have a strong theo-
retical, and not just historical, need to deepen the exploration of Kantian
philosophy (Westphal 2004a, 268) and I think that Professor Westphal
himself significantly contributed to this kind of research. His works, and
in particular his 2004 book, Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism,
shed a new light on numerous aspects of Kant’s thought, making a contri-
bution that has already deeply marked the interpretation of texts. At the
same time, his way of looking at the ‹Copernican revolution›, along with
his book Hegel’s Epistemological Realism (1989), has been one of the
most powerful stimuluses to expose some debatable aspects of today’s
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approach to the practice of analytic philosophy and brought a breath of
fresh air to the debate about realism. The complex of essays contained in
the recent volume he edited, Realism, Science, and Pragmatism – the
occasion for our meeting – is clear proof of what I just said. In this paper
I would like to concentrate on the first issue of the three mentioned in the
title of this volume – Realism – and attempt a dialogue with Professor
Westphal, whose position I found very helpful to study.
My aim is twofold: first, I will try to show how our perspectives con-
verge on some qualifying theses. Secondly, I want to point out those as-
pects in which they are in some ways different, starting from the attitude
they assume towards Kant – who held that empirical realism and tran-
scendental idealism walk hand in hand. Professor Westphal thinks not
only that he himself can maintain a realist position regarding «our empir-
ical knowledge of molar objects and events in space and time» (Westphal
2004a, 3; 2006), but also that he can defend this position via a transcen-
dental proof analogous to the transcendental proof with which Kant in-
tended to confute Descartes’ «problematic» idealism and Berkeley’s
«dogmatic» idealism (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 244, B274). For this rea-
son Professor Westphal’s realism aims to be a realism sans phrase (in
other words, devoid of any further specification) (Westphal 2004a: 3, 5;
2006: 787 n. 18) with a transcendental proof. I, instead, maintain the idea
of a relativized a priori, and thus refuse a strong (Kantian) conception of
synthetic a priori judgments and distrust the notion of ‹transcendental›1. Nev
1 Let me bring to mind here the exact (and weighty) words used by Kant to introduce this
notion: «I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects
as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be
possible a priori» (17811–17872/1985: 59, A11f.=B25f.), where the term a priori has to be
intended as absolutely and not relatively a priori: «In what follows […] – Kant says – we
shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experi-
ence, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience» (17811–17872/1985: 43, B2f.).
My position is based on the negation of synthetic a priori judgments as they are intended by
Kant, a negation that I think I have formulated in such a way that it becomes reflexively self-
consistent (see below note 2). I admit a relativized a priori of an analytic kind and a relativ-
ized synthetic a priori of a theoretical and constitutive nature as it had been partially seen by
Reichenbach in his 1920 book on relativity and a priori knowledge (see Parrini 1976, II/6;
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ertheless, I think I can provide some arguments to support a kind of em-
pirical realism capable of taking into account some still valid aspects of
Kant’s thought and giving a new voice to what I called the guiding ideals
of the esprit positif: anti-metaphysical objectivism, moderate epistemic
relativism and rationalism (Parrini 1995/1998). These are the very same
ideals that Logical Empiricists had tried to revive, joining the linguistic
turn of philosophy – now in many ways a bygone trend – and using tools
that later proved to be inadequate, such as the verification theory of
meaning, the linguistic theory of the a priori and the substitution of epis-
temology by the logical analysis of scientific language (a substitution
attempted mainly by Carnap, which Professor Westphal rightly criticized
[2015e: § 6.1]).
So, my empirical realism seeks to be an empirical realism without
transcendental idealism and without Kantian synthetic a priori judg-
ments2. Similarly to Professor Westphal’s realism sans phrase, my real
2002b, ch. 7; 2003). Later also Michael Friedman (1999; 2001) recovered the relativized a
priori, but only in the linguistic-analytic sense prevailing in Logical Empiricism (even in
Reichenbach after the 1920 book and the 1921–22 essay on the discussion on Relativity
Theory) and brought to its maximum development by Carnap with his conception of linguis-
tic frameworks. Also the recent volume by David J. Stump (2015) does not take into consid-
eration that double aspect of the relativized a priori in spite of the proper accentuation it
places on the constitutive aspect, in other words on that aspect which Reichenbach (1920
and 1921–22) originally underlined to distinguish his position from Schlick’s (see Parrini
2002b, ch. 7). Today Professor Westphal shows how it is not possible to conceive the rela-
tivized a priori as exclusively linguistic and even (contra Robert B. Brandom) not merely as
metalinguistic (2016c). For Westphal this bears implications on van Fraassen’s constructive
empiricism too (2016d).
2 Like Logical Empiricists I qualify my conception as empiricist rightly because it does
not recognize the existence of synthetic a priori principles in Kant’s sense (see, for example,
Parrini 2003). Referring to the classification discussed by Professor Westphal in his book
Hegel’s Epistemological Realism (1989, 48–50), I would say that my empiricism is neither
a Concept empiricism, nor a Verification empiricism, nor a Meaning empiricism; but I would
also say that it is neither a Judgment empiricism if with this kind of position we mean the
dogmatic statement that «All judgments are either analytic and a priori or else synthetic and
a posteriori; there are no synthetic a priori judgments» (Westphal 1989: 48). If intended in
this sense, in fact, my empiricism could not satisfy what according to Hegel is «an important
desideratum for any theory of knowledge: any account claimed to be an account of human
knowledge must be able to be known in accordance with its own principles» (Westphal 1989,
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ism is argued via an epistemic reflection, but in my case this epistemic
reflection is kept distinct from Kant’s transcendental reflection because it
cannot put forward the ‹coercive› claims of a transcendental proof3. Ac-
tually, I am convinced that both the different kinds of realism and the
different types of anti-realism have good arguments on their sides, so that
to disentangle the controversy among them requires considering the pos-
sibility of reworking some crucial concepts such as ‹truth› and ‹reality›
(a Bearbeitung in the Herbartian sense [Herbart 18131–19374/1964, in
particular: §§ 1, 4, 6, 7]), and that conclusive decision on which position
to assume depends upon considerations of global plausibility. This also
makes unavoidable specifying the relevant conceptions with some
phrase. The very nature of the divergences among these conceptions de-
mands specifying whether what we want to criticize, rebut or accept and
defend is a metaphysical realism, a common sense realism, an empirical
realism, a semantic realism, a direct realism, a scientific realism, an
epistemological realism and so forth, including the possibility of combin-
ing more than one option. It is not by chance that qualifications such as
these appear in many titles of the essays collected in Realism, Science,
49). This is because «the judgment that all judgments are either analytic and a priori or else
synthetic and a posteriori is itself neither analytic and a priori nor synthetic and a posteri-
ori. There is therefore at least one synthetic a priori judgment on this view; thus judgment
empiricism is false» (Westphal 1989, 49). Actually, in such a form Judgment empiricism is
not a reflexively self-consistent view. I do not think, though, that it is possible to make the
same objection to my position. I only maintain, more modestly, the negation of the synthetic
a priori as a hypothesis made plausible both by the scientific developments that led to the
désagrégation of Kant synthetic a priori (as Reichenbach used to say in 1935–36), and by a
structural aspect of that same empirical knowledge that led to such a désagrégation. I am
referring to the fact that empirical knowledge seems structurally subject to two contrasting
principles: the very well known principle of empirical underdetermination of theories and the
less known, but equally important principle of the theoretical overdetermination of experi-
ence (see Parrini 2003). Therefore the negation of the synthetic a priori is simply a hypothe-
sis suggested by the historical experience of the development of scientific knowledge, hy-
pothesis that as such I defended as one of the principles of an epistemological theory which
has to be considered as tentative and fallible as any other (Parrini 2002a: 190f.).
3 I use the expression «coercive» in Nozick’s (1981: 1–27) sense. For my view of
epistemic reflection, see the Answer to Question 6 on Skepticism.
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and Pragmatism.4
The existence of this difference, however, does not preclude that both
my empirical realism and Professor Westphal’s realism sans phrase af-
ford vindication of the reality of molar objects falling under our observa-
tional possibilities and of the entities posed by the best of our scientific
theories (scientific realism). One aspect of Professor Westphal’s work
that I appreciate the most is his criticism of van Fraassen’s constructive
empiricism (see, in particular, Westphal 2014a; 2016d). To go a bit more
in depth, I think it is best to start from our different ways of approaching
Kant.
2. Professor Westphal’s book on Kant takes as its starting point Jacobi’s
well known objection according to which without the Ding an sich it is
not possible to enter Kant’s system and with the Ding an sich it is not
possible to stay within it. While Neo-Kantians and the so called epistem-
ic interpretations try to neutralize such an objection by conceiving the
Ding an sich as some sort of limit idea, or by weakening the distinction
between empirical phenomenal objects and Dingen an sich from an
ontological-metaphysical to a purely methodological distinction, Profes-
sor Westphal objects to these readings without recurring to the compli-
cated device of postulating duplicate entities (empirical-phenomenal ob-
jects and Dingen an sich) and affections (transcendental affection and
empirical affection). He takes the bull by the horns and tries to show – in
particular against Henry H. Allison’s epistemic interpretation (19831/
20042) – that it is possible to remove the apparent inconsistency high-
lighted by Jacobi not only without denying, but even highlighting the
metaphysical-ontological presuppositions of the critical-transcendental
approach to the problem of knowledge (Westphal 2004a: 4f., 38–41,
116– 118).
I must specify that, in spite of my considering as an exaggeration the
patchwork theory supported by some scholars, I still have doubts about
4 The latest work in which I again considered this question is «Esercizi di equilibrio in
filosofia» (Parrini forthcoming; here you may also find references to relevant prior works).
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the possibility of reaching an interpretation able to account coherently
for all the aspects of Kant’s texts, and in particular of the Critique of
Pure Reason. The same unquestionable and crucial acquisitions con-
tained in Professor Westphal’s 2004 book, and the possibility of using
them for a realism sans phrase instead of a transcendental idealism, lead
me to think that already in Kant’s works, in a more or less underground
way, we can find the reasons that make a ‹coercive› solution to the
realism/anti-realism contrast almost unfeasible, and that our interpreta-
tive difficulties are also the symptom of alternative theoretical possibili-
ties which for various reasons, including his conditioning by the
philosophical-scientific context of his time, Kant himself was not able
fully to see and explore. Of course, I do not say this to limit the impor-
tance of the work carried out by Professor Westphal, who has signifi-
cantly increased the transparency of many pages of Kant’s text. Even I,
who differently from him relate to Kant by developing a systematic read-
ing strongly influenced by Cassirer’s Neo-Kantianism and the epistemic
interpretation, do not believe in the least that the conceptual knots that I
favor can provide the basis for an exhaustive reconstruction of Kant’s
texts, and not even for a more comprehensive and globally adequate re-
construction than the one defended by Professor Westphal.
In order to better highlight the point I am interested in, I will start
from a problem that since Herbart’s time has constituted a strong reason
to revive the realist instance against the claims of transcendental ideal-
ism. I am referring to the problem – raised by Herbart (18131–19374/-
1964: §150) – of how it is possible to attain not knowledge in general nor
synthetic a priori knowledge, but determinate knowledge, the problem, in
other words, regarding particular questions and manifest in specific judg-
ments (see Parrini 1994: 213–219). I think that such a problem is a thorn
in the side of Kant’s transcendental idealism and so supports some of
Professor Westphal’s theses. Kant, in fact, recognizes both that we, being
a mixture of passivity and spontaneity, cannot know but by receiving ab
extra the matter that constitutes the sensible manifold, and that the deter-
minate character of knowledge depends on such a sensible manifold,
since only reference to what is given in experience allows us to explain
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why in some circumstances we perceive a circle rather than a square, or
why the light of the sun in some cases (for example, clay) causes its hard-
ening whereas in others (for example, wax) causes its melting (cf. Kant
17811–17872/1985: 610, A765f./B793f.). All this means that we recog-
nize some form of externalism, in other words: the fact that our knowl-
edge is conditioned by something structured that is external to us (see
Parrini 1994, in particular: §§ 5–6; 2015b). It is in this sense, I think,
that Professor Westphal showed how some realist ‹pushes› can already
be found in Kant together with the anti-realist ones, and he has exploited
at best those aspects of the critical position that can be turned in support
of a «realism sans phrase» (for example, its distinction from an idealism
that includes also the matter of knowledge).
I shall place instead at the center of attention those aspects of the crit-
ical position that are an obstacle to realism, starting from a statement that
we find in the «Refutation of Idealism»5. In «Note 3» of the «Refutation»,
Kant states again that he tried «to prove», against Descartes and Berke-
ley, «that inner experience in general is possible only through outer expe-
rience in general» (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 247, B278f.), in other words
«that the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a de-
terminate consciousness of the self» (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 247,
B278). At the same time, though, he feels the need to specify that from
his confutation «it does not follow that every intuitive representation of
outer things involves the existence of these things, for their representa-
tion can very well be the product merely of the imagination (as in dreams
and delusions)» (Kant 17811–17872/1985, 247, B276). Kant adds that to
ascertain «whether this or that supposed experience be not purely imagi-
nary», we must look both at the «special determinations» of such an ex-
perience and to its «congruence with the criteria of all real experience»
(Kant 17811–17872/1985: 247, B278f.). For him, in fact, «truth and illu-
sion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment
about it, … i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understanding»
5 For detailed analysis of the Kantian text in which the conceptual knots I favor for
systematic reasons appear, see Cinzia Ferrini’s (2014) essay on the illusions of imagination
in Kant’s first Critique.
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(Kant 17811–17872/1985: 296, A293=B350).
In «Remark III» of the Prolegomena Kant had already intervened on
this same question stating that
the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the na-
ture of representations which are referred to objects (for they are the
same in both cases), but by their connection according to those rules
which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of
an object, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in expe-
rience or not. (Kant 1783/1977: 34; AA 4:290)
As we know, for Kant norms and criteria of any truthful experience pre-
cisely consist of those conditions that in «The Postulates of Empirical
Thought» are used to characterize the (alethic) modalities of possibility,
reality (in the sense of Wirklichkeit) and necessity as pure a priori con-
cepts of the intellect (categories) that «have the peculiarity that, in deter-
mining an object, they do not in the least enlarge the concept to which
they are attached as predicates. They only express the relation of the con-
cept to the faculty of knowledge» (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 239, A219/
B266). In fact Kant defines ‹wirklich› as what, in addition to agreeing
with the «formal conditions of experience» («that is, with the conditions
of intuition and of concepts») regarding the category of possibility, «is
bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensa-
tion» (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 239, A218=B265f.).
In order not to overlook an essential aspect of transcendental ideal-
ism, this characterization of reality must be linked to a passage contained
in the first version of the transcendental deduction of categories, in
which Kant asks the question about «what we mean by the expression ‹an
object of representations», and more precisely about «what […] is to be
understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and conse-
quently also distinct from, our knowledge». Kant’s answer is that «this
object must be thought only as something in general = x, since outside
our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this
knowledge as corresponding to it». And
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since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and
since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us –
being, as it is something that has to be distinct from all our representa-
tions – the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else
than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of
representations. (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 134f., A104f.)
This way of intending the object of knowledge has given rise to very dif-
ferent interpretations including openly phenomenalistic and idealistic
ones. For me there is no doubt that Kant did not intend to state that the
object of knowledge is the product of the cognitive activity of the human
mind. This interpretation is not only incompatible with many aspects of
his thought, but is also contradicted by some explicit statements, first of
all that contained in §14 of the transcendental deduction of categories.
Here he declares that «the representation» determines or constitutes a
priori the object not in the sense of producing it «in so far as existence is
concerned, for we are not here speaking of its causality by means of the
will», but in the sense that it makes it possible «to know anything as an
object» (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 125f., A92/B125). It is integral to
Kant’s transcendental-epistemic reflection – the importance of which has
been meritoriously highlighted by Professor Westphal (2004a: 16–18) –
that the human intellect is neither an ectypus intellect nor an archetypus
intellect; it is a mixture of passivity and activity. The material of knowl-
edge, the sensible manifold, is not a product of the human intellect: it is
received by the intellect via the a priori forms of sensibility and is shaped
by the forms of the intellect to give rise to the object as a knowable and
known empirical-phenomenal object. For this reason, Kant says,
though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that
it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical
knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of
what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely
as the occasion) supplies from itself. (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 41f.,
B1f.)
For reasons I cannot examine here I think that, also after having excluded
the possibility of interpreting Kant’s idealism in a material sense, this
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idealism is still untenable in principle, also for the new and important
reasons produced by Professor Westphal (whose considerations can be
connected with the developments of evolutionary epistemology6). What
remains for me, though, is the fact that, in the cited passage about what
we must mean by the object of knowledge, Kant clearly states that con-
ceiving the object as a reality epistemically totally independent of the
cognitive activity seems to frustrate the possibility of any criterion which
allows us to evaluate the correctness, adequacy or truth of our cognitive
claims as cognitively determinate claims. This is because – as Kant says
– «outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over
against this knowledge as corresponding to it» (Kant 17811–17872/1985:
134f., A104f., emphasis added). As we well know, this is one of the diffi-
culties – for me the first and decisive one – that torment all the forms of
metaphysical realism, based as they are on an absolutist conception of
the object of knowledge and on a correspondence theory of truth7.
For all these reasons I see in Kant the forerunner of those conceptions
of epistemic relativism that, against metaphysical realism, have high-
lighted the following three points: (i) our cognitive activity develops
within a framework of presuppositions (which are for me not only of a
linguistic, but also of a theoretical and methodological nature); (ii) with-
in the complex of our cognitive claims there is something more than what
we can justify on the basis of experience alone (epistemological anti-
reductionism); and (iii) in principle it is not possible to compare our
epistemic-conceptual frameworks with a reality in itself, non-conceptual-
ized, to evaluate their conformity or their correspondence with it.
What I have been saying so far affects the conception of truth that
Kant delineates in some short passages of the Critique of Pure Reason.
These passages show that logical-transcendental idealism, although it
6 See, in particular, Westphal (2004a: 84).
7 Some authors such as Michael Devitt and John Searle maintain forms of realism not
beholden to the correspondence theory of truth. It seems to me, though, that against them we
can bring the critical remarks made in an essay included in the book under discussion,
Realism, Science, and Pragmatism: J. Knowles «Naturalism without Metaphysics» (2014,
esp.: 205–207).
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rejects the possibility of knowing the Ding an sich or considered in itself,
and thus rejects metaphysical realism, does not imply either an
epistemological nihilism (according to which an object of knowledge
non-metaphysically conceived would be a pure nothing) (see Parrini
2011b: 165f.) or a sort of knock out argument against any form of real-
ism (see Parrini 2001). Kant’s idealism, in some regards like an Aristote-
lian view, accepts a correspondence conception of truth, though qualify-
ing it as a mere «nominal definition» of truth (Kant 17811–17872/1985:
97, A58=B82), and on the criterial level makes the truth of a sentence
such as ‹Snow is white› depend not only on satisfaction of the formal
conditions of knowledge, but also its material conditions (Kant 17811–
17872/1985: 97–99, A57–62=B82–86; see Parrini 1994: 198–203). This
means that for Kant too the truth of the judgment ‹Snow is white› de-
pends on the fact that certain material conditions of knowledge, in other
words certain empirical data (the whiteness of the snow), are given,
rather than that the existence of such conditions depends on the truth of
the cognitive claim that the snow is white. Where Kant departs from the
traditional realist view is only when he says that for us discussing of truth
and falsity is cognitively possible not with respect to a world of Dingen
an sich (or per se considered), but with respect to a world of phenomena
epistemically conditioned by our forms of sensibility and intellect (see
Parrini 2015b: 44–47)8.
3. Since Kant’s time a lot of water has passed under the bridge. In par-
ticular, many epistemologists have refused the Kantian conception of
synthetic a priori principles. Cognitive activity, though, and epistemolo-
gical reflection upon it, continued to show both the aspects that push to-
wards realism and the aspects that push towards anti-realism in a balance
of pros and cons that leads me to despair of the possibility of solving the
Realismusfrage on a rigorously and exclusively demonstrative level (see
8 It seems to me that in his The Revolutionary Kant. A Commentary on the «Critique of
Pure Reason» (2006) Graham Bird underestimates the meaning and importance of Kant’s
conception of truth. For this and other observations on Bird’s interpretation, see Parrini
(2010a: 507, n. 19; 515–517, n. 36).
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Parrini 2001). In this balance the Kantian argument stressed above, that
we do not have at our disposal a criterion of truth based on a comparison
between the ordo idearum and the ordo rerum, or better between our
cognitive claims and reality in itself, still plays a role that I deem deci-
sive. Please note that by saying ‹decisive›, I do not mean demonstrative.
I do not use this argument as a demonstration capable of blocking meta-
physical realism. In other words, I do not maintain that, because we can-
not access reality in a non-epistemically conditioned way, the notion of
reality in itself or absolute reality is a notion devoid of sense, or a contra-
dictory, or a totally void. Supporting this idea (as logical empiricists
have often done) would mean committing a non sequitur rightly de-
nounced for example by Frederick Will (1979), a philosopher dear to
Professor Westphal and by him justly appreciated in his book on Hegel’s
epistemological realism (1989: 63f.). I think, though, that the conflict
between the will to maintain the notion of reality in itself and the impos-
sibility of establishing a connection between such a reality and our cogni-
tive claims is – using Professor Westphal’s own expression – «compel-
ling»; and compelling to such a degree that I do not think this conflict
can be solved by an epistemological conception capable, at the same
time, of overwhelming the skeptic and putting together – as Professor
Westphal says in his book on Hegel – «a coherence criterion of truth […]
with a correspondence analysis of truth» (1989: 64).
That is why it seemed to me (and still seems) that an epistemological
answer trying to be – as Hegel rightly asked (see Westphal 1989: 16) –
reflexively self-consistent can and has to be looked for, in a Herbartian
spirit, in a reworking of concepts, or, if we prefer, in their elaboration in
the sense of a Carnapian explication. So I tried to find some ‹explica-
tions› of the notions of truth and reality that, once broken their ties with
the ontological-metaphysical presuppositions from which aporias and
dyscrasias derive, could be as close as possible to, and coherent with, our
cognitive (or doxastic, or epistemic) practices. That’s because, although I
appreciate the importance and acumen with which Professor Westphal
saved Kant from Jacobi’s objection without abandoning the ontological-
metaphysical aspect of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, I think that the
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problem of knowledge should be developed via an epoché from existen-
tial presuppositions and thus continuing on the road marked out not only
by Husserl (followed by Carnap9), but also by Cassirer. Cassirer, in fact,
starting from Kantian thought and Jacobi’s criticism, has supported a
statement of this problem that inquires into the conditions of validity of
the different types of judgments without previously taking for granted the
distinction between «the soul and the things» (Cassirer 19111/19223:
662f.). In other words, without posing preliminary claims of an ontologi-
cal kind, and thus abandoning the pre-Kantian formulation, which, in or-
der to understand the connection between the (knowing) ego and the
(known) things, projected them both onto a «common metaphysical back-
ground» (ibid.). For Kant the matter of inquiry is «no longer made up of
the things, but of the judgments on the things» (ibid.): «judgment and
object are strictly correlative concepts, so that in the critical sense, the
truth [= reality] of the object is always to be grasped and substantiated
only through the truth of the judgment» (Cassirer 1918/1981: 285).
4. Here I cannot retrace the reasons that led me, starting from this state-
ment and seeking to avoid the extremes both of metaphysical realism and
alethic relativism (see Parrini 1995/1998; 2001; 2002a; 2011), to expli-
cate the notions of truth and reality as regulative ideals that guide our
cognitive activity towards syntheses or objectivizing unifications richer
and richer in empirical material and more and more compact, simple,
harmonious and conceptually and theoretically comprehensive10. I shall
9 For my interpretation of the relationship between Husserl and Carnap, with particular
reference to the notion of explication, the use of epoché, and the genesis of the concept of
empirical reality in Der logische Aufbau der Welt and in Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie,
see Parrini (2012a: 82–95).
10 In his book on Hegel, Professor Westphal (1989: 245, n. 118) quotes a paper in which
Otto Neurath rejects the notion of truth preferring to it the notion of ‹plausibility› because
«‹true› and ‹false› are absolute terms» that should be avoided (Neurath 1940–41: 138f.,
emphasis added). In a certain sense, I recover the ‹absolute› value of the notion of truth, but
I qualify it as a regulative ideal that is purely formal and empty ‹criterially›. This means that
the application of the category of truth is not determined by methodological and/or theoreti-
cal principles conceived as the necessary (let alone the necessary and sufficient) conditions
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limit myself to highlighting the most significant points of convergence
and divergence between my position and Professor Westphal’s.
Professor Westphal’s conception is anti-foundationalist and anti-Car-
tesian; I too think that the cognitive process, which is paradigmatically
evident in scientific activity, cannot count on supporting points, either
external or internal, that guarantee its absolute foundation. It rests only
on itself: its pivotal elements are some beliefs that it provisionally ac-
cepts (for empirical and/or rational reasons) and then it searches for pos-
sible areas of empirical intersection between alternative hypotheses and
theories evaluating other beliefs. This continuous self-correcting move-
ment, virtually endless, can touch not only the beliefs that have been
screened, but also those initially not questioned or even presupposed. As
for Professor Westphal, who in his book on Hegel also ties in Peirce’s
fallibilism, also in my view the true (intended, though, as a regulative
ideal) does not collapse into on the justified. In fact, the function I assign
to truth remains that which derives from our realist instinct which implies
that even the best justified beliefs can be revised in the light of the new
acquisitions of research. In sum, for me too the ‹strong› notion of truth
has the functions to keep open the possibility that we can always be
for its use. As I too reject metaphysical realism, my conception of truth is not linked to two
kinds of absolutism rightly criticized by Neurath: the absolutism of the correspondence
theory of truth and the absolutism of the absolutely valid principles of reason and knowledge.
Since – for reasons that are ultimately linked to the old neoempiricist criticism of the theory
of a priori synthetic judgments – it does not seem possible to tie the unifying effort that
constitutes knowledge to any content-determined cognitive norm, the notion of truth as a
regulative ideal has to be conceived as an empty category that fills itself with the criteria and
contents of judging that emerge, confront themselves and gradually impose themselves in the
course of the changing turns of historical events. Knowing then becomes a process that
constantly renews itself and finds only relative resting points. These resting points and the
evaluation criteria connected to them give a content (specifiable only as they both occur) to
the categories of objectivity and truth when such categories are applied to concrete cases and
particular judgments. This leaves untouched the unitary ‹transcendence› of the categories of
objectivity and truth as ideals of a potentially infinite series of cognitive processes intention-
ally aimed at their realization. For my interpretation of the transcendence/immanence relation
in the cognitive process, see Parrini 1995/1998 («Foreword to the English Edition») and
1999.
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wrong, even in the case of beliefs that to our eyes are supported or cor-
roborated by the best reasons we have been able to find. The difference
with metaphysical realism, though, lies in the fact that in my conception
this openness made possible by keeping the notion of truth is not towards
things in themselves or considered in themselves, but is towards experi-
ence assumed in its ideal inexhaustibility and interpreted and organized
by and in our always modifiable or renewable rational procedures.
The notion of reality, as much as the one of truth, also must be con-
sidered as a category to be intended, keeping in mind our concrete and
effective cognitive practices, and thus purifying it from the metaphysical
encrustations associated with it in its ordinary use, which is ill-consid-
ered and philosophically uncritical. In fact, if, taking the hint from a fa-
mous saying by Einstein (1936: 313), we look, not at what we say we do
when we try to know something, but at what we actually do, we immedi-
ately see that in this attempt of ours reality in itself does not intervene in
any way. Within our efforts of theoretical-argumentative elaboration, the
only other operative role is played by the data of experience which we
can exploit or which we can produce via new experiments.
Like the notion of truth, also the notion of empirical reality I defend
must be conceived as a regulative ideal. It allows us to explicate non-
metaphysically the realist instinct that actually pervades our cognitive
efforts, both commonsense and scientific. This realist instinct must be
intended, not as the confident though naive intent (destined to fall under
the blows of skeptical objection) to catch something of reality in itself,
but as the effort that proved to be historically fruitful of approaching
more and more an epistemically optimal integration of empirical data and
rational components. For this reason I consider objectivity a task that is
realized in ever partial and reviewable achievements. In my perspective,
the conquest of the truth with a capital ‹T› would be to reach a ‹defini-
tively› accomplished integration of the conceptual and the empirical mo-
ments. However, this ‹perfect› integration can only be intended as an-
other regulative ideal, in principle unreachable, given the inexhaustibility
of experience and perhaps also of our inventive capacities (cf. Parrini
2013/forthcoming).
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In an analogous way we can explicate the (greater or lesser) feeling of
certainty which accompanies our partial, provisional and reviewable cog-
nitive syntheses. This feeling must not be intended as the more or less
strong persuasion of having touched reality in itself, or having ap-
proached it, but as the more or less sound conviction of having reached
beliefs that are unlikely to be affected by the subsequent developments of
knowledge and thus have very good titles to posit their candidacy as part,
in one way or another, of the ‹final› beliefs of an ideal and never obtain-
able ‹definitive› synthesis between empirical material and rational ele-
ments (cf. Parrini 2013/forthcoming).
Within empirical realism as I conceive it, that commonsense dualism
(so dear to both Professor Westphal and myself) that recognizes an exis-
tence to us as knowing subjects, on the one hand, and the molar objects
and events in space and time peculiar to our common experience on the
other, can legitimately be considered a framework of reference devel-
oped on the basis of experience and raised to the rank of presupposition
of our own typical cognitive practices. What empirical realism requires is
only that such a dualism is intended not as an ontological-metaphysical
dualism (in other words, as true because it conforms to reality in itself),
but as a dualism that I would call ontic (see Parrini 2011b: 21f.; 2015b: §
5; 2015c: 69–75). With the expression ‹ontic› I wish to underline that
this framework has asserted itself as a Naturprodukt (in Mach’s words
[18861–19116/2008: 41]) capable of accounting in the most epistemically
acceptable way for our inner and external experience, in other words of
the experience of subjects who live in a world of medium-sized objects,
far both from the microcosm of the indefinitely small and the macrocosm
of the indefinitely large.
This dualism must be considered true or real, or better, presumably
true or real, in the non-metaphysical sense of truth or reality I specified
above. It seems to me that such a conception grows stronger when we
consider, as Professor Westphal taught us (2014a), that the mere logical
possibility that is global perceptual skepticism – the counterpart to foun-
dationalistic philosophies of a Cartesian kind – if evaluated in the light of
Newton’s Rule 4 of experimental philosophy and Kant’s (and Hegel’s)
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cognitive semantics, is nothing but an idle metaphysical speculation. It
must be understood, though, that for an empirical realist who also is a
scientific realist, relativity theory and quantum mechanics are limitations
which he must accommodate. These two theories show that both the do-
main of the indefinitely large and some peculiar physical measuring in-
teractions we have in the domain of the indefinitely small require a more
complex cognitive relation than the one offered by common sense to de-
scribe the ontic (non-ontological) relationship between subject and ob-
ject of knowledge.
References
ALLISON, H.
19831/20042 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense, Yale
University Press, New Haven and London.
BIRD, G.
2006 The Revolutionary Kant. A Commentary on the «Critique of Pure Rea-
son», Open Court, Peru (Ill.).
CALDERONI, M.
1924 «Il senso dei non sensi», in Scritti di M. Calderoni, ed. by O. Campa, 2
vol., Società anon. editrice «La voce», Firenze (1924), vol. I: 259–265.
CASSIRER, E.
1910 Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, Meiner, Hamburg.
1918 Kants Leben und Lehre, Meiner, Hamburg.
1953 Substance and Function, trans. by W.C. Swabey & M.C. Swabey, in
E. Cassirer, Substance and Function & Einstein’s Theory of Relativity
(Dover, New York), 3–346.
1981 Kant’s Life and Thought, trans. by J. Haden, Yale University Press,
New Haven.
19111/19223 Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der
neueren Zeit, Band II, third edition, B. Cassirer, Berlin.
DUHEM, P.
1904-061;19142 La Théorie Physique: Son Objet, Sa Structure, Chevalier et Rivière,
Paris.
57
Esercizi Filosofici 10, 2015
1962 The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. by P.P. Wiener,
Atheneum, New York.
EINSTEIN, A.
1936 «On the Method of Theoretical Physics», Philosophy of Science 1,
163– 169.
19491/19512 «Remarks on the Essays Appearing in this Collective Volume», in Al-
bert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by P.A Schilpp, (Tudor:
New York, second edition 1951), 663–688.
FERRINI, C.
2014 «Illusions of Imagination and Adventures of Reason in Kant’s first Cri-
tique», in Philosophie nach Kant: Neue Wege zum Verständnis von
Kants Transzendental- und Moral Philosophie, edited by M. Egger
(De Gruyter, Berlin), 141–188.
FINE, A., and FORBES, M.
1986 «Grünbaum on Freud: Three Grounds for Dissent», The Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 9, 237–238.
FRIEDMAN, M.
1999 Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
2001 The Dynamics of Reason, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
GETTIER, E.
1963 «Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?», Analysis 23(6), 121–123.
HERBART, J.F.
18131–18374 Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, in J. F. Herbart, Sämmt-
liche Werke, Band 4, ed. by K. Kerbach & O. Flügel, Scientia Verlag
Aalen, Darmstad (1964).
Kant, I.
17811, 17872 Kritik der reinen Vernuft, Hartknoch, Riga.
1783 Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissen-
schaft wird auftreten können (1783), 
1926 Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N.K. Smith (Macmillan, London),
second impression with corrections, 1933; reprinted, 1985.
1977 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come
forward as Science, trans. by P. Carus, revised by J.W. Ellington, Hac-
kett, Indianapolis.
KNOWLES, J.
2014 «Naturalism without Metaphysics», in Westphal (2014b), 200–218.
58
Parrini / Empirical Realism without Transcendental Idealism
KUHN, T.S.
19621, 19963 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago and London; third edition, 1996.
1973 «Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice», lecture printed in
T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension. Selected Studies in Scientific Tra-
dition and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1977),
320–339.
MACH, E. 
1886 Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen G. Fischer, Jena; reprinted in
Mach (2008), Band 1.
1911 Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen
zum Psychischen, G. Fischer, Jena, reprinted in Mach (2008), Band 1.
2008 Ernst-Mach-Studienausgabe, ed. by G. Wolters, Xenomoi, Berlin.
NEURATH, O.
1940–41 «Universal Jargon and Terminology», Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, New Series 41, 127–148.
NOZICK, R.
1981 Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(Mass.).
PARRINI, P. 
1976 Linguaggio e teoria. Due saggi di analisi filosofica, La Nuova Italia
Editrice, Firenze.
1994 «On Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: Truth, Form, Matter», in Kant and
Contemporary Epistemology, edited by P. Parrini (Kluwer, Dordrecht),
195–230.
1995 Conoscenza e realtà. Saggio di filosofia positiva, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
1998 Knowledge and Reality. An Essay in Positive Philosophy, Kluwer,
Dordrecht; English version of Parrini (1995).
1999 «Immanenzgedanken and Knowledge as Unification. Scientific Philos-
ophy and Philosophy of Science», in Experience, Reality, and Scien-
tific Explanation. Essays in Honor of Merrilee and Wesley Salmon, ed.
by M.C. Galavotti & A. Pagnini (Kluwer, Dordrecht), 15–37.
2001 «Realism and Anti-Realism from an Epistemological Point of View»,
in The Problem of Realism, edited by M. Marsonet (Ashgate, Alder-
shot, Hampshire, England), 135–159.
2002a Sapere e interpretare. Per una filosofia e un’oggettività senza fonda-
menti, Guerini e Associati, Milano.
2002b L’empirismo logico. Aspetti storici e prospettive teoriche, Carocci,
Roma.
2003 «Reason and Perception. In Defense of a Non-Linguistic Version of
Empiricism», in Logical Empiricism. Historical and Contemporary
59
Esercizi Filosofici 10, 2015
Perspectives, ed. by P. Parrini, M.H. Salmon & W. Salmon (Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh), 349– 374.
2004 «Preti teorico della conoscenza», in P. Parrini, Filosofia e scienza
nell’Italia del Novecento, Guerini e Associati, Milano, 169–199.
2010a «Epistemologia», in L’universo kantiano. Filosofia, scienze, sapere,
ed. by S. Besoli, C. La Rocca, R. Martinelli, Quodlibet, Macerata,
493–528.
2010b «Epistemological Conventionalism beyond the Geochronometrical
Problems», in The Architecture of Knowledge. Epistemology, Agency,
and Science, ed. by R. Egidi, Carocci, Roma, 191–223.
2011a «Pragmatisme logique et probabilisme radical dans la philosophie
italienne du XXe siècle», Revue de synthèse 132, 191–211.
2011b Il valore della verità, Guerini e Associati, Milano
2012a «Fenomenologia ed empirismo logico», in Storia della fenomenologia,
ed. by A. Cimino e V. Costa, Carocci, Roma, 81–110.
2012b «Science and Philosophy», Diogenes 59, 89–101.
2015a «Empirical Realism without Transcendental Idealism. Comment on
Kenneth R. Westphal, Esercizi filosofici 10(1), 41–61.
2015b «Il problema del realismo dal punto di vista del rapporto soggetto/
oggetto», in Realtà, verità, rappresentazione, ed. by P. L. Lecis, V.
Busacchi, P. Salis, Angeli, Milano, 21–51.
2015c «Ontologia e epistemologia», in Architettura della conoscenza e
ontologia, ed. by R. Lanfredini, Mimesis, Milano, 39–77.
Forthcoming «Esercizi di equilibrio in filosofia», in A Plea for Balance in Philoso-
phy. Essays in Honour of Paolo Parrini, vol 2, ed. by R. Lanfredini &
A. Peruzzi, Ets, Pisa (vol. 1, 2013; vol. 2, forthcoming).
PUTNAM, H.
1981 Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
REICHENBACH, H.
1920 Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori, Springer, Berlin; reprinted
in idem (1979), 3:191–302.
1922 «Der gegenwärtige Stand der Relativitätsdiskussion», Logos 10(3),
316– 378. 
1935–36 «L’empirisme logistique et la désagrégation de l’a priori», in Actes du
Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique (Sorbonne, Paris
1935), I: Philosophie Scientifique et Empirisme Logique, Hermann,
Paris (1936), 28–35.
1965 The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, trans. by M.
Reichenbach, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles.
1978 «The Present State of the Discussion on Relativity. A Critical
Investigation», in H. Reichenbach, Selected Writings, ed. by M.
Reichenbach & R. S. Cohen, Reidel, Dordrecht, 2 vols) 2: 3–47.
60
Parrini / Empirical Realism without Transcendental Idealism
1979 Gesammelte Werke, Band 3: Die philosophische Bedeutung der Relati-
vitätstheorie, ed. by A. Kamlah & M. Reichenbach, Vieweg & Sohn,
Braunschweig/Wiesbaden.
SHAPERE, D.
1984 Reason and the Search for Knowledge. Investigations in the Philoso-
phy of Science, Reidel, Dordrecht.
STUMP, D.J.
2015 Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science. Alternative Inter-
pretations of the A Priori, Routledge, New York & London.
VAILATI, G.
1905 «Review of Duhem [(1904–061–19142)]», Leonardo, 3, 593–595; re-
printed in idem. (1972), 220–222.
1972 Scritti filosofici, edited by G. Lanaro, La Nuova Italia, Firenze.
WESTPHAL, K.R.
1989 Hegel’s Epistemological Realism, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
2004a Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
2006 «How does Kant Prove that We Perceive, and not merely Imagine,
Physical Objects?», The Review of Metaphysics 59(4), 781–806.
2014a «Hegel’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference, Newton’s Meth-
odological Rule Four and Scientific Realism Today», Philosophical
Inquiries 2(1), 9–65.
2014b ED., Realism, Science, and Pragmatism, Routledge, London.
2015a «Some Observations on Realism, Science and Pragmatism», Esercizi
filosofici 10(1), 17–39.
2015b «Some Replies to Remarks and Queries by Professor Parrini, Students
and Members of the Audience», Esercizi Filosofici (Trieste) 10(1),
63–79.
2015e «Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons:
Carnap, Quine and Sellars», Journal for the History of Analytic Phi-
losophy 3(8), 1–67.
2016c «Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophical Semantics and Synthetic Necessary
Truths», in Sellars’s Place in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. by S.
Brandt & A. Breunig (Routledge, London).
2016d «Elective Empiricism or Parsimonious Pyrrhonism? Vetting van Fraas-
sen’s Voluntarism», in Pyrrhonizing Scepticism?, edited by R. Romão
& P. Tunhas.
WILL, F.L.
1979 «The Concern about Truth», in Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume, ed.
by G. W. Roberts, George Allen & Unwin, London, 264–284.
61
